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More on Moore: A Novel Strategy for
Compensating the Human Sources of
Patentable Cell-Line Inventions Based
on Existing Law
Christopher Scott Pennisi*
In 1986, Clonetics Corporation introduced the
first commercial product containing live human skin
cells.1 The “EpiPack” provides normal human
epidermal cells, grown in the laboratory, in a
unique growth medium, enabling researchers to
quickly screen the reaction of human skin cells to
“drugs for diseases such as cancer, chemicals like
pesticides, a variety of cosmetics or even biological
warfare agents.”2
Such an invention allows
pharmaceutical, cosmetic and medical researchers
to test products without using animals or other, less
accurate, biological models.3 The EpiPack was
created from human skin samples purchased from
doctors and patients following elective plastic
surgery.4
INTRODUCTION
Cells are the basic structural unit of living animals and plants.5
Cells are self-regulating entities containing miniature organs
*

Princeton University, B.A., 1996; New York University, M.S., 1998; Fordham
University J.D. 2001. The author would like to thank Megan O’Connor for all her
support and editorial assistance. N.B.: this note was entered in the 2001 International
Intellectual Property Society Competition.
1
See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS, at 24 (1987) [hereinafter
OTA REPORT], available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/alpha_f.html (last
visited Apr. 8, 2001); see also Rex Dalton, Cloned Human Skin Cells Go On The Market,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 15, 1987 at B1.
2
See Dalton, supra note 1, at B1.
3
See id.
4
See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
5
See id. at 5.
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(organelles) surrounded by a living membrane filled with liquid
(cytoplasm).6 Cells can be specialized or “differentiated” for a
variety of functions, including the manufacture or digestion of
compounds, photosynthesis, and antibody production, among
others.7 Scientists and medical researchers often study the various
functions of an organism by examining isolated cells.8 This is an
essential technique for the development of biotechnology.9 Before
they can be studied, however, cells must be removed from a body,
isolated and cultured on a medium.10 These cell cultures are
known as “cell-lines” because they come from, and give rise to,
other cells along a similar hereditary lineage.11 Due to the relative
difficulty of developing and growing a cell-line in a laboratory
from a human cell sample, the process is considered an art form.12
Once developed, cell-lines can be used for diagnostic, therapeutic,
research and commercial purposes or any combination thereof.13
Research uses for human tissue generally focus on expanding the
depth of biological research through study of the characteristics
and functions of organs, tissues, and cells.14
Commercial
development stems from this scientific or basic research.15
Commercial usage of cell-lines focuses on developing products for
further scientific research or medical treatment purposes.16 In
product-oriented contexts, random specimens of human tissue can
be used in one-time processes to create or test products and can
then be discarded — as cells in an EpiPack are intended to be used.
6

See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5; See MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 5-9 (Harvey
Lodish et al. eds., 3d ed. 1995).
7
See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that cells are specialized, or
differentiated, to perform specific functions).
8
See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
9
See id. at 5.
10
See id. at 5, 32.
11
For example, epithelial cells can give rise to genetically similar epithelial cells.
See MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, supra note 6, at 196; see also OTA REPORT, supra note
1, at 3 (defining a “cell-line” as “a sample of cells, having undergone the process of
adaptation to artificial laboratory cultivation, that is now capable of sustaining
continuous, long-term growth in culture”).
12
See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that establishing a successful human
cell culture from a given sample of tissue varies in probability between .01 percent for
some liver cells and 100 percent for skin cells).
13
Annie O. Wu, Note, Surpassing the Material: The Human Rights Implications of
Informed Consent in Bioprospecting Cells Derived From Indigenous People Groups, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 986-87 (2000) (describing the utility of cell-lines).
14
See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
15
See id. at 8.
16
See id.
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Alternatively, tissue specimens with particular properties might be
sought out and made part of long term research, investigating
specific scientific questions or producing particular products, like
cells used to create cell-lines. The potential for economic gain
from commercialization of cell-lines, while sometimes great, is
difficult to predict during the cell-lines’ development.17 Without
human biological samples, the biotechnology industry would have
great difficulty producing and testing the drugs, devices, and other
products that it develops in an effort to improve medical care and
the general quality of human life.18 Despite its noble purpose, the
biotechnology industry is motivated in part by profit.19 The
expansion and diversification of the industry raises many ethical
questions regarding ownership in human-derived tissue and cells
used in the production of commercially successful cell-lines.20
These questions were thrust into the legal limelight by the seminal
California Supreme Court case of Moore v. The Regents of the
University of California.21 The court, in a conservative opinion,
refused to extend any ownership rights in a cell-line invention to
its human source.22 Due in part to the moral backlash over the
court’s rejection of any such ownership rights, the question of
property rights to profitable cells will undoubtedly be revisited by
future courts.
This Note analyzes the law and policies surrounding the denial
of property rights to the human sources of cell-line inventions as
17
As with all commercial products, for a cell-line to be profitable there must be a
demand for the product. Demand for cell-lines is tied to the type of research the line
facilitates. Because it is difficult to predict what the scientific community will focus on
in terms of research, it is difficult to predict whether a cell-line will be “in demand,” and
thus profitable.
18
“Currently, researchers testing drugs or chemicals use hard-to-obtain cadaver skin,
hairless animals and . . . humans. Each of these test modes has its own faults – even
humans, whose bathing habits can distort results.” Dalton, supra note 1. It is believed
that lab-grown skin cells may be “a more exact, efficient and less costly method of testing
drugs . . . .” Id.
19
See, e.g., id. (For example, in the context of epidermal cell-lines there is “intense
competition in the growing tissue-cloning field – where investors are staking millions of
dollars on the technology of individual firms.”); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that “[i]t has been suggested
by writers that biotechnology is no longer a purely research oriented field [and that]
links . . . between academics and industry to profitize biological specimens are a subject
of great concern”).
20
See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
21
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
22
See id. at 480.
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highlighted by Moore v. The Regents of the University of
California.23 It suggests a novel solution to the dilemma of
human-source rights that would adequately recompense the source
of a cell-line invention for his contribution. It argues that a right to
compensation can be asserted under existing elements of patent
law by applying the decades old shop right doctrine. It then argues
that the most effective means of administering this relationship is
to alter standard informed consent documents for medical
procedures so that a patient does not release all interest in
inventions resulting from his tissue merely by consenting to the
procedure. By drawing on existing elements of patent and contract
law, this solution requires no legislative effort and avoids many of
the pitfalls of simply paying sources for tissue samples before the
true value of their cells is known. Part I of the paper provides the
factual background of the Moore case. Part II critiques the
California Supreme Court’s reasoning in refusing to allow Moore
to recover against his physician and the University of California at
Los Angeles (“UCLA”) Medical Center. Part III discusses
whether medical patients should retain rights in their potentially
valuable excised tissue cell-line inventions. Finally, Part IV
presents an efficient system for managing a patient’s hypothetical
right to share in the commercial exploitation of his tissue within
the existing body of law.
I. IS IT ETHICAL TO COMMERCIALIZE PRODUCTS BASED ON
HUMAN-DERIVED CELL SAMPLES INDEPENDENT OF CONSENT FROM
THE SOURCE?

A. Moore v. The Regents of The University of California
John Moore first visited UCLA Medical Center (operated by the
Regents of the University of California (the “Regents”)) on
October 5, 1976, shortly after he learned that he had hairy-cell
leukemia, a rare type of cancer.24 Moore was admitted to the
23

Id.
Id. at 481. See generally Arnold S. Freedman & Lee M. Nadler, Malignancies Of
Lymphoid Cells, available at http://www.harrisonsonline.com (last visited April 27,
2000) (explaining that hairy cell leukemia is a rare type of cancer occurring
predominantly in males over age 40 with expression of specific adhesion molecules
involved in localizing cells to the spleen and marrow as well as massive splenomegaley,
24
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hospital and had blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily
substances taken from him by attending physician Dr. David W.
Golde, who confirmed Moore’s diagnosis.25 Golde was “aware
that certain blood products and blood components were of great
value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts and that
access to a patient whose blood contained these substances would
provide competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages.”26
Three days later, Golde recommended that Moore’s spleen be
removed, and informed Moore that he “‘had reason to fear for his
life, and that the proposed splenectomy operation . . . was
necessary to slow down the progress of his disease.’”27 Prior to the
splenectomy, Golde and Shirley G. Quan, a researcher employed
by the Regents, made arrangements to obtain portions of Moore’s
spleen after it was removed, for research purposes unrelated to
Moore’s medical care.28 Golde gave written instructions to this
effect on October 18 and 19, 1976.29 Moore’s spleen was removed
on October 20, although he was not informed of what subsequently
happened to it.30
Moore returned to UCLA Medical Center several times between
November 1976 and September 1983 pursuant to Golde’s
“representations ‘that such visits were necessary and required for
[Moore’s] health and well-being, and based upon the trust inherent
in and by virtue of the physician-patient relationship . . . .’”31
Moore traveled to UCLA Medical Center where Golde removed
samples of Moore’s blood, blood serum, skin, bone-marrow
aspirate, and sperm.32 Moore was advised that “the procedures
were to be performed only [at UCLA Medical Center] and only
under Golde’s direction.”33 Golde ultimately realized significant
financial gain through his exclusive access to Moore’s cells.34

where the spleen extends greater than 8 cm below the lowest rib on the left side and/or
weighs more than 1,000g).
25
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
26
Id. at 481 (citation omitted in original).
27
Id. (ellipsis in original) (citation omitted).
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
31
Id. (citation omitted).
32
See id.
33
Id.
34
See id.
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Throughout the period of time that Moore was being treated by
Golde, Golde conducted research on Moore’s unique cells.35
Although the commercial potential of cells is difficult to predict at
the outset of research, “‘competing commercial firms
in . . . relevant fields have . . . predict[ed] a potential market of
approximately $3.01 Billion Dollars by the year 1990 for [such
cells].’”36 As a result, when Golde ultimately developed a cell-line
from Moore’s T-lymphocytes,37 he and Quan applied for and were
issued a patent for that line, with the Regents of the State of
California named as its assignees.38 Pursuant to the established
policy, the Regents, Golde, and Quan were to share in any profits
arising from the patent and, with the Regents’ assistance, Golde
negotiated contracts for commercial development of the cell-line
and derivative products.39 Under one such agreement, Golde
became a consultant to Genetics Institute, acquired 75,000 shares
of stock, and was to be paid $330,000 over three years in exchange
for exclusive access to the materials and research performed on the
“Mo” cell-line and products derived from it.40
Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals41 was “‘added to the agreement,’ and
compensation payable to Golde and the Regents was increased by
$110,000.”42
As a result of Golde’s failure to disclose his preexisting research
and economic interests in Moore’s unique cells prior to performing
any invasive procedures, Moore named Dr. Golde, Shirley Quan,
the Regents, Genetics Institute, and Sandoz as defendants in a
lawsuit stating thirteen causes of action.43 The trial court,
35

See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
Id. at 482 (citation omitted in original).
37
Golde initially named the cell-line “Mo” after Moore, but later renamed it to
conceal the connection between patient and profit. See Charles E. Lipsey et al.,
Protecting Trade Secrets In Biotechnology, 224 PRACTICING L. INST. 807, 915 (1986).
38
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-82.
39
See id. at 482.
40
See id.
41
In April, 1996, following a corporate merger with Ciba, Sandoz became part of
Novartis Pharma. See Strong Swiss Franc Mars Ciba/Sandoz Results Will Merge With
Sandoz to Form Novartis in Move That Has Been Approved by Shareholders, EUR.
CHEMICAL NEWS, Apr. 29, 1996, at 19.
42
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 482 (citation omitted in original).
43
The causes of action were 1) conversion; 2) lack of informed consent; 3) breach of
fiduciary duty; 4) fraud and deceit; 5) unjust enrichment; 6) quasi-contract; 7) bad faith
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 8) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; 9) negligent misrepresentation; 10) intentional interference with
prospective advantageous economic relationships; 11) slander of title; 12) accounting;
36
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however, considered only the first, conversion, and sustained a
general demurrer on the remaining actions.44 Moore claimed that
he had a property interest in his own cells which extended beyond
their removal from his body, and that the defendants’ conduct
constituted a substantial interference in his right of possession of
those cells.45 Moore further argued that, despite his execution of a
general waiver of rights to his cells, he had never authorized the
use of his cells for research and that Golde’s usage constituted
conversion.46 Under California state law, conversion is a strict
liability tort requiring proof that the property allegedly converted is
personal property, and that the conversion itself resulted in
damages.47
The trial court sustained the defendant’s demurrers to the
conversion allegation on the grounds that Moore failed to
specifically allege that he did not know that tissues removed during
his treatment at UCLA might be used for research as well as for his
personal medical treatment.48 Although the Superior Court gave
Moore leave to amend his original complaint, he appealed to the
California Court of Appeals instead.49 The Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissals of the trial court and concluded that
Moore’s claim of a property interest in his own excised tissues did
not lack basis in legal authority, public policy or scientific fact.50
Further, the court found that Moore had sufficiently stated an
action for conversion.51
and 13) declaratory relief. See id. at 482 n.4.
44
See id. at 482-83.
45
See id. at 487.
46
See Maureen S. Dorney, Moore v. The Regents of the University of California:
Balancing the Need for Biotechnology Innovation Against the Right of Informed Consent,
5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 333, 340 (1990) (“The consent form included a portion where the
individual was to circle either ‘I do’, or ‘I do not’ ‘voluntarily grant to the University of
California any and all rights I, or my heirs, may have in any cell-line or any other
potential product which might be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained
from me.’”).
47
See Poggi v. Scott, 139 P. 815, 816 (Cal. 1914) (“The foundation for the action of
conversion rests neither in the knowledge nor the intent of the defendant. It rests upon the
unwarranted interference by defendant with the dominion over the property of the
plaintiff from which injury to the latter results. Therefore neither good nor bad faith,
neither care nor negligence, neither knowledge nor ignorance, are of the gist of the
action.”).
48
See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
49
See id.
50
See id. at 503-506.
51
See id. at 511.
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The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeals,
finding that Moore was not entitled to share in the profits from the
cell-line, because it was legally and factually distinct from Moore’s
cells.52 With respect to the issue of informed consent, the
California Supreme Court analyzed Moore’s cause of action under
three well established principles. These were, “[f]irst, ‘a person of
adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit
to lawful medical treatment’ . . . [s]econd, ‘the patient’s consent to
treatment, to be effective, must be an informed consent’ . . . [t]hird,
in soliciting the patient’s consent, a physician has a fiduciary duty
to disclose all information material to the patient’s decision.” 53
Specifically, the court concluded that:
1) a physician must disclose personal interests
unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or
economic, that may affect the physician’s
professional judgment; and 2) a physician’s failure
to disclose such interests may give rise to a cause of
action for performing medical procedures without
informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.54
Not surprisingly, the court held that the sufficiency of such
disclosures must be measured from the patient’s perspective.55
The California Supreme Court held that Moore’s assertion that
Golde concealed an economic interest in the postoperative
procedures gave rise to a legitimate breach of fiduciary duty,
regardless of the fact that the splenectomy had some therapeutic
value.56 Because the Regents, Quan, Genetics Institute and Sandoz
were not physicians, much less Moore’s physician, none of these
defendants were held liable for breach of fiduciary duty as they
had no responsibility for obtaining Moore’s informed consent.57
Although the court did find that Golde breached the principles of
informed consent law by failing to inform Moore of his research
52
The court felt that because the cell-line is the product of an inventive effort, it was
a entity distinct from Moore’s original cells and that this therefore extinguished Moore’s
rights. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 492-493.
53
See id. at 483 (citations omitted).
54
Id.
55
See id.
56
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 485.
57
See id. at 486.
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interest,58 it did not specifically discuss whether informed consent
must address research performed on human tissue after it is excised
from the body.59 The court did not have to address this issue,
because it could settle the underlying monetary dispute based on
well-settled principles of informed consent rather than
incorporating non-legal impressions of patients’ rights into the
common law.60 By basing its decision on informed consent, the
court was able to ground its reasoning in the more germane tort of
performing unauthorized procedures on a patient rather than
addressing the esoteric problem of who owns cell-lines.61
Informed consent law gives research subjects a right to determine
whether research is performed on them, but not an interest in that
research once they have consented to it.62 Because the research
had not been consented to, the court did not look beyond the
informed consent cause of action to the deeper question posed by
Moore, namely, whether the human source of a cell-based
invention should retain rights in the tissue co-opted by the
inventors, including the right to profit from it.
II. WHO SHOULD DERIVE FINANCIAL BENEFIT FROM THE SALE OF
PATENTED CELL-LINES?
Moore’s conversion cause of action was rejected by the
California Supreme Court because Moore failed to establish a
property interest in his spleen after it was removed.63 The court
held inter alia that “[s]ince Moore clearly did not expect to retain
possession of his cells following their removal, to sue for their
conversion he must have retained an ownership interest in them.
58

See id. at 485 (finding that Moore adequately alleged that Golde had an
“undisclosed research interest in Moore’s cells at the time he sought Moore’s consent to
the splenectomy”).
59
See id. at 483-87.
60
See id. at 483-97. The court found that Moore sufficiently alleged a cause of
action for “breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient’s consent.”
Id. at 483. The court, however, declined to extend conversion liability to encompass
Moore’s situation, believing that “problems in this area are better suited to legislative
resolution.” Id. at 493.
61
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483-97.
62
See Dorney, supra note 46, at 361 (commenting that while there are federal
guidelines on informed consent, they were drafted to protect people from the dangers of
physical and mental experimentation rather than commercial development of excised
tissue).
63
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-93.
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But there are several reasons to doubt that he did retain any such
interest.”64 The court cited three fundamental reasons for rejecting
Moore’s claim to a property interest in his spleen cells: 1) no court
had previously found that a person had a common law property
interest in their cells; 2) analogous statutory law in California
limited patients’ control over their excised cells;65 and 3) the
patented Mo cell-line was factually and legally distinct from the
original cells taken from Moore.66 The court also concluded that,
contrary to public policy, the existence of such a right would enact
a significant barrier to efficient medical research.67 The majority
did not take a firm position on whether property interest in bodily
organs could ever arise.68
The California Supreme Court relied on the premise that rights
not embodied within a statute do not exist and that therefore,
Moore lacked a right under California law in excised human
cells.69 The court looked to the California Health and Safety Code
for the source of any such right in tissue and identified § 7054.4,
concerned primarily with disposal of human products used in
research,70 as the most relevant statute to the determination of
property rights in excised cells.71 According to the court:
64

See id. at 488-89.
The court was referring to California Health and Safety Code § 7054.4, concerned
primarily with disposal of human products used in research. See discussion infra pp. 75658.
66
See Human Cells and Tissue for Sale (A Caveat) – Did you Advise Your Patient or
Client of His Commercial Rights?, 62 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 199, 201 (1991) (explaining that
California statutes governing analogous subjects such as human tissue, corneal tissue and
dead bodies demonstrated to the Moore court that the California legislature had chosen to
regulate the disposition of these items by specialized statute and not through judicial
expansion of tort law).
67
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 487.
68
See id. at 488-89. See also Judith B. Prowda, Moore v. The Regents of the
University of California: An Ethical Debate on Informed Consent and Property Rights in
a Patient’s Cells, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 617 (1995).
69
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 491-92 (stating that the statute’s practical effect is to
drastically limit a patient’s control over his excised cells, eliminating “so many of the
rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left
amounts to ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ for purposes of conversion law”).
70
Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7054.4, Human remains following conclusion of
scientific use; disposal (2000).
71
The court cited the following excerpt from the statute in support of its choice:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, recognizable anatomical parts, human
tissues, anatomical human remains, or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific
use shall be disposed of by interment, incineration, or any other method determined by
the state department [of health services] to protect the public health and safety.” See
65
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[O]ne cannot escape the conclusion that the
statute’s practical effect is to limit, drastically, a
patient’s control over excised cells. By restricting
how excised cells may be used and requiring their
eventual destruction, the statute eliminates so many
of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one
cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to
‘property’ or ‘ownership’ for the purposes of
conversion law.72
Paradoxically, the court acknowledged that “the Legislature did
not specifically intend this statute to resolve the question of
whether a patient is entitled to compensation for the nonconsensual
use of excised cells.”73 As a result, it is difficult to understand
exactly how the court relied on this statute for anything other than
what its plain language identifies as its purpose, the proper
disposal of potentially infectious human tissue.74 Furthermore, the
court failed to explain why this statute extinguishes a source’s
rights in their tissue once it is separated from the body, yet
supports the conclusion that an invention in these cells becomes
the property of researchers without an explicit statutorily created
right.75 It is axiomatic that individuals own the cells currently
growing within their bodies much as they own the whole body.
Although a patient may consent to the removal of some of those
cells for medical treatment, or even research purposes, it is
intuitive that at some point any consent to such procedures lapses
or expires, and that without the renewed consent by the source, the
removed cells should be disposed of. California Health and Safety
Moore, 793 P.2d at 491 (alterations in original).
72
Id. at 491-92.
73
Id. at 491.
74
See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7054.4, Human remains following conclusion
of scientific use; disposal (2000).
75
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 491-92. The court offers only a weak economic argument
in support of this illogical conclusion. See id. at 495-96.
The theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse threatens to
destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical
research. If the use of cells in research is a conversion, then with
every cell sample a researcher purchases a ticket in a litigation
lottery. Because liability for conversion is predicated on a continuing
ownership interest, “companies are unlikely to invest heavily in
developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty
about clear title exists.”
Id. (quoting OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 27).
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Code § 7054.4 merely codified this expectation.76
The court mistakenly equated possession of tissue with retention
of rights in the tissue, and thus its entire reasoning on the issue of
property rights in cell-lines is suspect. Moreover, the court did not
provide any reasoning to buttress its conclusion that Moore had no
property interest in his tissue because the court confused the issue
of ownership with the issue of determination.77 Ultimately,
however, the question not posed by the court is more relevant than
the issues the court did address. The court did not address why
there is no common law or statutory property right in one’s own
tissue independent of whether that tissue is in the actual possession
of its former host. In requiring consent for research to be
performed upon excised tissue, Health and Safety Code § 24175
implies that such a right exists,78 yet the Moore court affirmatively
declared that it does not.79
76
Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7054.4 (2000) (legislating the disposal of tissue at
the conclusion of scientific use).
77
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-97. The Moore court stated, in part, “[s]ince Moore
clearly did not expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal, to sue for
their conversion he must have retained an ownership interest in them.” See id. at 488-87.
In so stating, the court completely ignored the possibility that Moore had, in granting
limited consent for research purposes, retained the right to determine the use of his tissue,
but not to demand that the tissues be returned. Thus, it confused his claim of right to
determine the use of his tissue with his right to continued possession of it. This concept
is analogous to a copyright, wherein the artist creating a work remains the creator
regardless of who owns the rights to profit from the work. Although the artist cannot
demand the return of his work from the owner of the performance right, it is axiomatic
that he retains the ability to institute legal action against pirates who use his creation
without permission.
78
See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 24175, Medical experiments; informed consent
(2000). The statue states, in part, that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, no
person shall be subjected to any medical experiment unless the informed consent of such
person is obtained.” See id. The California Supreme Court in Moore did acknowledge
that “a physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, in
order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed consent, disclose
personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that
may affect his medical judgment.” Moore, 793 P.2d at 485. The Moore court, however,
did not extend this idea of consent to the granting of property rights in excised cells,
stating that this right to consent is a “limited right to control the use of excised cells”
which may still exist despite the fact that California Health and Safety Code §7054.4
eliminates “so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply
assume that what is left amounts to ‘property.’” See id. at 491-92.
79
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 491-92 (stating that California Health and Safety Code
§7054.4 eliminates “so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot
simply assume that what is left amounts to ‘property’”); see also id. at 503 (dissent)
(refuting the majority’s reliance on section 7054.4 in determining that no property right in
excised body cells exists).
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III. SHOULD PEOPLE HAVE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THEIR DISCARDED
TISSUE?
Until recently, blood drawn for medical testing was considered
useless after the test was performed.80 Today, however, we have
reached an age in medicine where what was once waste is now a
valuable commodity.81 Yet, the legal view of these once-discarded
tissues and fluids has not changed to reflect their new value. As
Moore’s failed conversion cause of action demonstrates, we do not
recognize rights in what is voluntarily removed from our bodies.82
This has created a paradoxical duality whereby researchers can
claim patients’ tissue as their own, base an invention around the
tissue, commercialize it, then exclude the human source from any
benefits realized. What is created is undoubtedly due in part to the
contribution of the source, but the source cannot enforce any claim
to part-ownership because he lacks a property interest in his
excised cells or tissue.83 If property rights in one’s excised tissue
were recognized, a patient would be empowered with the myriad
causes of action available in property and tort for any injury to,
taking of, or unauthorized use of their “property.”84 It would also
enable the holder to grant rights of usage to others via sale, lease,
license or any legal device used to transfer interests in real
property in whole or in part to another person or entity, and thus
demand compensation for a role in the production of a cell-line
invention.85 At present, however, the only property rights
recognized in the human body are limited to personal use, sale of a
few of its products, and transferability of cadavers following
death.86

80

See Prowda, supra note 68, at 612.
See id. at 612 (noting that “as the field of biotechnology has expanded, human
body components . . . have acquired real monetary value”).
82
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-97.
83
See, e.g., id. (denying Moore’s cause of action in conversion and claim of a
proprietary interest in each of the products created from his cells).
84
For example: conversion, replevin, adverse possession, unjust enrichment, and
misappropriation. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§ 15, 130 at 1020 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (conversion, misappropriation); Jim’s Furniture Mart, Inc. v.
Harris, 356 N.E.2d 175, 176 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (replevin); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET
AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7, (1984) (adverse possession); Tulalip Shores, Inc. v.
Mortland, 511 P.2d 1402, 1404 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (unjust enrichment).
85
See, e.g., RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 189-208 (3d
ed. 1975).
86
See Hannah Horsley, Reconsidering Inalienability for Commercially Valuable
81
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Three justifications are proffered for the failure to acknowledge
any further property rights in the human body: 1) selling the
human body is rightly eschewed as an immoral infringement on the
sanctity of personhood; 2) the marketing of the human body would
lead to exploitation of the poor and ignorant; and 3) the individual
products of the human body have no inherent value once the host is
finished using them and thus cannot be exchanged for valuable
consideration.87 As further explored below, none of these three
justifications has any substantial foundation in law or even logic,
and thus fail to bolster the argument for limited property rights in
the products of one’s body. Given the failure of these traditional
justifications, it follows that plaintiffs such as Moore might have
legitimate recourse to claim compensation for their role in
producing a profitable cell-line invention.
The most common argument against the recognition of property
rights in anything less than the totality of one’s body is that this
would “result in the commodification of the person and violate
notions of human dignity and personhood.”88 While this argument
holds true when considering essential and unique parts of the
human body, such as limbs, it is hard to support the notion that
regenerating body products, such as blood, cells, or tumors, are
part of anyone’s personhood.89 If these body products are not
central to personhood, the removal and subsequent sale of such
products cannot diminish human dignity so long as their sale or
removal is not forced or required.90
Unfortunately, the sale of scientifically or commercially
valuable products of the human body is severely restricted under

Biological Materials, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 223, 230 (1992) (“A few [body parts] may
be sold (e.g. blood, semen, hair), but the majority may only be given away (i.e. [organs
and tissues and other scientifically and commercially valuable] biological materials).”).
87
See Horsley, supra note 86, at 239; Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of
Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue,
34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 237 (1986); Prowda, supra note 68, at 612.
88
Horsley, supra note 86, at 230 (“Personhood” is used to represent the notion that
the metaphysical characteristics of the “person” and the physical body are so interrelated
as to be one in the same. Thus, that respect for the inalienability of persons includes
similar respect for the body.).
89
See id. at 232. Indeed, the sale of blood was fully accepted by society prior to the
spread of deadly and difficult-to-detect blood borne pathogens such as H.I.V.
90
Perhaps the real loss of dignity lies in the idea that the sale of body products is a
derivative form of prostitution. But this argument carries little weight in light of the goal
of the exchange – the contribution to the expansion of scientific knowledge.
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the National Organ Transplant Act (“N.O.T.A.”).91
The
restrictions under N.O.T.A. are based on the “commodification”
justification and an anxiety over the potential market consequences
of permitting such sales.92 The N.O.T.A. precludes the sale of
organs out of a fear that allowing such sale would give rise to a
black market in organs that would coexist with any legal one.93
But, as this ban applies equally to non-traditional “organs,” such as
cells and other replenishing tissue, and traditional organs,
N.O.T.A. is overbroad in that it fails to take into consideration the
fact that some “organ” sales do not present any danger of
sustaining black market trade.94
Upon first impression, it might seem that the sale of body
products, like the sale of whole bodily organs, would lead to
coercion of the poor or ignorant into such sales by unscrupulous
organ traders motivated only by profit.95 Theoretically, the denial
91
See National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). N.O.T.A. makes it
“unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human
organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects
interstate commerce.” 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1991). Although § 274e encompasses cells,
blood and other bodily tissue, it does not explicitly restrict the sale of these materials, and
has never been read to do so. See Helen R. Bergman, Rationing Health Care: Social,
Political and Legal Perspectives: Note and Comment: Case Comment: Moore v. Regents
of the University of California, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 127, 143 (1992).
92
See Horsley, supra note 86, at 230. Congress identified the intent of such
legislation prohibiting the buying and selling of human organs as “directed at preventing
the for-profit marketing of kidneys and other organs.” S. Rep. No. 98-382 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3978.
93
See Horsley, supra note 86, at 230; S. Rep. No. 98-382 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3978.
94
So-called “black market organ sales” only concern vital organs that have
immediate present value for re-transplantation purposes, such as livers, hearts and
kidneys. In precluding their transfer for valuable consideration, the N.O.T.A. achieves
the laudable legislative aim of avoiding a wealth of problems that might result from the
emergence of a black market in transplantable organs. But, some “organs” under the
N.O.T.A., such as blood, stem cells, or excised tumors, have no present value except as
material for research. As raw material for research, these “organs” have only potential,
intangible, and uncertain value, which renders their black market worth zero. Therefore,
legal recognition of their sale by medical patients to researchers presents none of the risks
that recognition of vital organ sales would.
95
See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Human Flourishing and Limits on Markets, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 2139, 2140 (1997) (noting that extending markets to body parts “threatens to
exploit poor and vulnerable persons”); Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards:
Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ
Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 74-75 (1995) (noting that the World
Health Assembly’s 1991 resolution regarding organ donation recognized “the possible
abuse, coercion, and undue influence involved with live organ donors”).
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of property rights and the bar on any sales of organs would prevent
such situations by removing the profitability of exploitation. This
view fails to take into account the fact that biological materials
(other than discrete organs) with commercial value are rare, most
often discovered because they are malignant enough to require
their removal.96 It also fails to acknowledge the fundamental
difference between “before-the-fact incentive for acquiescence in
organ removal” and after-the-fact “participat[ion] in profits derived
from tissue already removed.”97 In fact, it can be argued that the
failure to sanction sales in some circumstances does not eliminate
the possibility of unscrupulous conduct, but merely shifts it from
organ brokers to researchers seeking to exploit body products for
commercial profits.98 Additionally, despite the N.O.T.A.’s allencompassing ban on organ sales from source to buyer,
commercialization of bodily tissue has already occurred to a large
extent via third party transfers between for-profit biomedical
entities and research laboratories.99
Therefore, prohibiting
individuals from selling their own body products serves only to
“defeat the individual’s right to profit from the commercial value
of his or her own tissue, but not to defeat the commercial interest
of the involved physician, investigator, university, or
biotechnology companies.”100 Recognition of a patient’s right to
market bodily material that is considered valuable by the medical
research community would “ensure a fairer distribution of wealth
between doctors and patients, comport with the legal protection of
a patient’s autonomy, and preserve the trust the doctor-patient
relationship that is threatened by the disparity in their rights to the
96

See Horsley, supra note 86 , at 237.
See Hardiman, supra note 87, at 239 (noting that “after-the-fact participation is
morally supportable”).
98
The Moore case did not contain any indication of the monetary judgment Moore
would have received as a result of Golde’s failure to disclose his own interests in
Moore’s cells and thus his failure to obtain Moore’s fully informed consent to the
splenectomy. Even without the court’s pronouncement of a monetary judgment,
however, we can conclude that Moore likely would have been awarded far less than the
defendants would earn from marketing the cell-line. Therefore, simple reasoning dictates
that in any case where consent to research is denied, but the potential profit from
commercialization of the subject’s body products might exceed the potential judgment
resulting from a action for breach of informed consent, conducting the research in
defiance of the subject’s wishes is economically justifiable.
99
See Hardiman, supra note 87, at 241.
100
Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, Biotechnology and the Commercial Use of
Human Cells: Toward an Organic View of Life and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 211, 247-48 (1989).
97
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profits of commercialization.”101
The right to sell scientifically and commercially valuable
biological products would “re-establish the trust necessary to the
interaction between physician and patient”102 as well as “allowing
[the] patient to enter the market that already exists in her
commercially valuable materials.”103 Presently, debate over such
sales focuses on three principal areas: 1) the equity of production
and distribution; 2) the added costs of payments to sources and the
transaction costs associated with that process; and 3) the value of
altruism in the donation of human biological materials.104 While
there are meritorious arguments against allowing tissue sales,105
they are outweighed by others in favor of compensating the source
of a cell-line that proves to be commercially successful. The
primary argument against paying sources of biological materials is
that biological materials have no inherent value in their
“preinvention” state.106 It is further argued that even if these
materials do have some value, it is outweighed by the harmful
physical impact if retained within the body.107 Finally, this line of
reasoning concludes that because the human sources do not
contribute to the inventive process that confers measurable
commercial value on their tissue, they should be excluded from
realized profits.108 This line of reasoning is both unfair and shortsighted with respect to the practical realities of such sales.
When a replenishing tissue can no longer perform its prescribed
function, it is valueless to its host organism from a biological
perspective. Similarly, diseased tissue may have a sizable negative
value to its host, necessitating its removal at the earliest possible
opportunity.109 Neither of these facts support the conclusion that
101

Horsley, supra note 86, at 235.
Id. at 238.
103
Id. at 242.
104
See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
105
Arguments against legalizing tissue sales include higher costs for the scientific
community (both transaction and actual costs in obtaining raw materials) and a longer
development time for potentially lifesaving drugs.
106
See Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in
Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn’t Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 628, 641 (1989).
107
See id.
108
See id.
109
For example, the spread of tumors, gangrene, and localized infection can be
substantially retarded or even halted through expeditious surgery to identify and remove
the affected tissue, organ, or area. See, e.g., F. Bozzetti et al., Comparing Surgical
102
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replenishing human tissue has no inherent monetary value once it
has fulfilled its biological function. Discovery of a new use for
what was once considered waste has frequently conferred a new
commercial life on that “waste.”110 For example, the need for cell
samples for the production of cell-lines arguably gives rise to a
new use and value for otherwise functionless parts of the human
body, like Moore’s diseased spleen. The rarer the cell type, the
higher the value, assuming the sample is successfully converted
into a viable and commercially successful cell-line. Because
particular donors, like Moore, are sought out and prized for the
rarity of their cells, it is counterintuitive to assert that the cells are
devoid of value prior to the efforts of a particular inventor. This
rarity is an inherent value even if the host cannot capitalize it.111
Another factor that affects excised tissue’s worth is its source’s
valuation of the private information this tissue contains. Bodily
tissues and substances are often inseparable from certain
information about their source, including the existence of diseases
and medical conditions,112 genetic markers for predisposition to
others,113 and the full text of an individual’s chromosomes.114
Resection of Limited Hepatic Metastases From Colorectal Cancer to Non-Operative
Treatment, EUR. J. SURG. ONCOL. (1993) available at www.lexis.com.
110
For example, crop wastes that would otherwise be discarded at the end of a harvest
can be sold to refineries for use in the production of ethanol for gasohol, a high-octane,
clean-burning fuel for internal combustion engines. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GASOHOL: A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, at 3, 11, 47 (1979),
available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/ns20/alpha_f.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2001).
111
As the California Appellate Court pointed out in Moore, “[a] simple analogy
illustrates the point: ‘Crude oil may be ruining a farmer’s corn crop. The farmer may
even be willing to pay an oil refinery company to take it off his land. But, the farmer,
who would be unable without the refinery’s aid to turn the crude oil into a usable
commodity, is still entitled to a share of the refinery’s profits from his land’s product.’”
249 Cal. Rptr. at 507 n.13 (citation omitted).
112
For example, genetic screening for cystic fibrosis, risk for breast cancer,
Alzheimer’s disease, and many other genetic diseases is either currently available or
under development. See Marilyn Chase, Genetic Testing Needs Clear Plans For How to
Handle Treatment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1996, at B1.
113
For example, the presence of genetic markers for a propensity to develop cancer.
See, e.g., Joseph Palca, Keeping Genetic Information Under Wraps, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Mar. 13, 1997, at 6 (explaining that it is possible to evaluate a person’s risk for
developing certain types of breast and ovarian cancer based on the presence of the
BRCA1 gene).
114
Theoretically, possession of this information enables cloning via creation of a
complete copy of an individual’s DNA, inserting it into a fertilized egg, and growing it as
a “test tube” baby. See Gina Kolata, Scientist Reports First Cloning Ever of Adult
Mammal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at A1.

PENNISI.PP5

2001]

9/6/01 10:37 PM

MORE ON MOORE: A NOVEL APPROACH

765

“Publication” of this genetic information might be undesirable,
especially if express consent for such information transfer had not
been secured.115 Thus, when contemplating rights in excised
tissues, the potential for privacy invasion must be considered and
the disclosure of genetic information bargained for by the source.
Because bodily tissues have inherent value, it is fundamentally
indefensible to assert that biotechnology, as a commercial industry,
should be provided with its raw materials free of cost.116 Like any
other property, biological materials should be transferable for
valuable consideration, whether the consideration is in exchange
for the tissue’s uniqueness or to compensate the source for his
authorization of the publication of his private genetic information.
Administrating such a system would interject significant
transaction costs into the world of biological research if it were
necessary to conduct a tissue “sale” every time a scientist wanted
to undertake biological research.117 These costs would be
justifiable only if there were some guarantee that the researcher
would recoup his investment. As the Moore court pointed out, this
could stifle the progress of biomedical research.118 Fortunately,
there is a more efficient system for administering such payments,
one that would not place such a high burden on the entirety of
biomedical research, but would focus particularly on compensating
the sources of commercially successful cell-lines.

115
See Natalie Anne Stepanuk, Comment, Genetic Information And Third Party
Access To Information: New Jersey’s Pioneering Legislation As A Model For Federal
Privacy Protection Of Genetic Information, 47 CATH. U.L. REV. 1105, 1117-23 (1998).
116
This is similar to the California Court of Appeal’s argument in Moore. The court
notes that Biotechnology has become a science for profit, and “[b]iological materials no
longer pass freely to all scientists.” Thus, the court “fail[s] to see any justification for
excluding the patient from participation in those profits.” Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
The California Supreme Court disagreed, but the point remains a pertinent one.
117
These transaction costs include the actual cost of paying the source as well as the
costs, both of time and effort, involved in contracting with the source for every intended
use of the bodily material.
118
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 495.
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IV. IF THE SOURCE OF A CELL-LINE HAS A RIGHT TO SHARE IN THE
PROCEEDS OF COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF HIS TISSUE, IS THERE
AN EFFICIENT SYSTEM FOR ENFORCING THAT RIGHT WITHIN THE
EXISTING BODY OF LAW?
The California Supreme Court’s rejection of the conversion
cause of action was a conservative decision based in part on its
unwillingness to make medical researchers strictly liable for any
unauthorized taking of bodily tissue.119 In retrospect, the decision
was an attempt to limit litigation over the profits of medical
research. Even though the ruling effectively limited meritless
claims, it had the unfortunate side effect of eliminating legitimate
claims like Moore’s.120 It need not have been so drastic.
After determining that it did not want to extend tort law to
Moore’s somewhat unique situation, the California Supreme Court
should have more thoroughly examined other bodies of law for
potential solutions to Moore’s alleged injury. Intellectual property
law was established for the precise purpose of assigning rights in
the intangible financial capital of novel discovery, as well as
rewarding individual contributions to the development of those
discoveries.121 By statute, patents have attributes of personal
property (albeit for limited periods of time) and the rights they
confer may be assigned by written instrument.122 As a result,
patent law contains possible solutions to the problem of the
equitable division of rights in potentially lucrative inventions.
There are two such elements of established patent law that could
provide a solution for this issue: the shop rights doctrine123 and the
preinvention contract.124 Both could have been adapted to address
119

See id. at 495-96 (“[T]he theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse
threatens to destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical research. If the
use of cells in research is a conversion, then with every cell sample a researcher
purchases a ticket in a litigation lottery.”). Additionally, because liability for tortious
conversion is predicated on a continuing ownership interest, “companies are unlikely to
invest heavily in developing, manufacturing, or marketing a product when uncertainty
about clear title exists.” See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
120
The most significant marker of the legitimacy of Moore’s claim is that the Mo cellline was a commercially successful product derived wholly from Moore’s cells. See
Moore, 793 P.2d 479.
121
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 112-13 (1990).
122
See 35 U.S.C.S. § 261 (2000).
123
See infra pp. 767-73.
124
See infra pp. 773-77.
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the taking Moore attempted to articulate in his complaint, while
avoiding the potential problem of high transaction costs stifling the
progress of medical research.
A. The Shop Right Doctrine
Under the traditional shop right doctrine, when an employee
makes and reduces to practice an invention on his employer’s time,
using his employer’s resources, he implicitly grants the employer a
limited, non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use (“practice”),
make and sell that invention.125 This license continues for the
entire duration of the patent, regardless of whether the inventor
remains an employee.126 This right passes automatically, and may
be transferred only if there is a complete succession of the entire
business (including good will) of the shop right holder.127 The
employee, as the patentee, retains all other aspects of the patent’s
traditional right to exclude, including ownership, licensing and
right to sue for infringement.128 The mere existence of an
employment relationship does not suffice to create a shop right in
an employer.129 The nature of the invention, the amount of
employer resource contribution, and the nature of the employment
all factor into a court’s determination of a shop right.130
There are three classes of employee inventions based upon the
subject matter of the invention and the resources the employer has
contributed. They are:
1. Employer-Specified Inventions — those made at the
employer’s request and expense;
2. General Inventions — those made partly or wholly at the
employer’s expense, but not specified by the employer;
125
See C.T. Dreschsler, Annotation, Application and Effect of “Shop Right Rule” or
License Giving Employer Limited Rights in Employees’ Inventions and Discoveries, 61
A.L.R.2D 356, § 4 (1958).
126
See Dreschsler, supra note 125, § 37; Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488, 494
(5th Cir. 1967).
127
See Drechsler, supra note 125, § 36.
128
See Sandip H. Patel, Note, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution Rights
in Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481, 493 (1996).
129
See Drechsler, supra note 125, § 5.
130
See Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownership Rights of Employee Inventions: The Role
of Preinvention Assignment Agreements and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
163, 169-70 (1994).
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3. Private Inventions — those made on the employee’s own
time, without the contribution of employer resources or other
employees during working hours, unless it was specified by the
employer.131
At common law, the employer is entitled to ownership of
employer-specified inventions regardless of a lack of preexisting
contract to this effect.132 He is entitled to a shop right in general
inventions, the extent of the right turning on the degree of the
employer’s contribution in terms of labor and capital.133 As to
private inventions, absent an agreement to the contrary, the
employer is not entitled to any ownership.134
If the doctor-patient relationship is viewed as a limited
employer-employee relationship (with the doctor in the role of
employee), then the shop right doctrine enables the patient to
financially benefit from patents based on his tissue. In a Moorelike fact pattern, where a physician obtains a patent based on
resources harvested from the patient,135 his employer, that patient
should earn an enforceable shop right to use, make or sell the
invention. The shop right would vest based on the category of
general inventions because the invention arose out of the
employer-employee relationship.136 In order to maintain equity,
the extent of the right should be limited by the degree of inventive
effort required to transform the patient’s tissue into the patented
invention, balanced against the rarity of the cells.137 In extreme
cases, this could result in the patient having a very small or very
large stake in the patent. Generally, the resulting shop right would
be a fairly limited one because it is highly unlikely that a physician
invents a cell-line entirely on time paid for by the patient. Nor is it
likely that the physician would make use of any of the patient’s
resources other than his tissue. This is balanced against the fact
that cell-lines (like Moore’s) are created almost exclusively out of
cells from the patient-employer.
This model has two
131

See id. at 166-68; see also United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.
178 (1933).
132
See Drechsler, supra note 125, § 39.
133
See id.
134
See id.
135
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-81.
136
See Pisegna-Cook, supra note 129, at 166 (defining General Inventions as “those
made partly or wholly at the employer’s expense, but not specified by the employer”).
137
See id., at 169-70.
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shortcomings. First, no analog to usage of an employer’s tools or
his physical plant exists in this hypothetical doctor-patient
paradigm. Second, the patient will not bear any of the financial
risks of the inventive process.
The nature of the doctor-patient relationship will likely undercut
the scope of patient shop rights in cell-line inventions, but in
today’s growing biotechnology market even a limited shop right in
a patented cell-line is a potentially lucrative intellectual property
holding.138 Regardless of its extent, however, the practical
operation of such a right raises the question of what the average
medical patient would do with a shop right in an invention which
would have limited application outside the world of medicine.
Although any shop right in a patient-derived medical invention
would allow the patient-source to make and use the invention,
these rights are meaningless if the patient lacks bio-engineering
skills or experience.139 It would be an absurdity to allow the
creation of a right on which a holder is unable to capitalize. While
the right to a cell-line invention is a powerful option for even the
most unsophisticated holder of that right, the fact that these rights
will be held by unsophisticated holders is also the fatal flaw of this
solution.
Traditionally, shop rights allow employers to sell inventions
made by employees on company time or with company resources
only when the invention is related to the employer’s business.140
138
In Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978)
the court established that reasonable royalties for patent infringement are determined by
the facts of each individual case. Id. at 1159. Although patent infringement is not
directly analogous to the issue in Moore, it provides a useful guideline. Thus, at least
from the perspective of the Moore case, even a nominal three percent of Golde’s
compensation from the sale of the resulting cell-line would have netted Moore $13,200
and 2250 shares of stock in Genetics Institute. See id. at 1159; Fromson v. Citiplate, Inc.,
699 F. Supp. 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding reasonable royalties of 3.1 to 7.5 percent);
Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding reasonable
royalties of 20 percent).
139
See, e.g., Charles J. Hanley, A Case of Good Research or ‘Genetic Colonialism’?;
Medicine: A Papua New Guinea Tribesman Came Out of the Bush Seeking Help for Ill
Children. When His Blood Was Found to Contain Clues to Leukemia, the U.S. Patented
It, Generating Ethical Questions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1996, at A1 (reporting on a cellline developed by NIH researchers from the blood of an indigenous Papua New Guinean.
The researchers subsequently obtained a U.S. patent for the cell-line. The tribesman
whose blood was used to create the invention is not listed as a beneficiary of the patent,
nor was he aware of the use of his blood, the creation of the cell-line or the grant of the
patent.)
140
See Drechsler, supra note 125, § 39. (“All the authorities agree that the scope of a
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With cell-line inventions, there is a unique employment
relationship, and the traditional determination of the employer’s
“business” cannot be applied. This poses a unique difficulty for
applying the shop right doctrine to the doctor-patient relationship.
The patient-employer’s “business,” his purpose in hiring the
physician, is “getting well” or staying that way. The subsequent
invention by the employee physician will have little, if any, impact
on this business interest. It would be tenuous for a court to hold
that every patient has a business interest in exploiting his own
body’s potential. It would be more tenuous still to say that patients
with no knowledge of their cells’ potential, and no demonstrable
intention to investigate, nonetheless deserve to be compensated for
the resulting inventions.
Most people with potentially patentable cells do not have careers
in biological-engineering or biotechnology. Thus, unless courts
recognize that a desire to profit from one’s bodily tissues is a
business interest, few future Moores will succeed in holding their
doctor accountable for profit sharing. Even if the patient-source
was professionally involved in biotechnology, there remains the
hurdle of finding a nexus between the patient’s hiring of the doctor
and the actual inventive process.141 Other than the unlikely
situation where a patient hires a physician for the primary purpose
of capitalizing on preinventions lurking within his body, it is
improbable that a court would find such an invention to be related
to the business interests of this employer-employee relationship.
Nonetheless, as discussed below, there is a significant public
policy rationale for courts to hold that any invention created from
human source material is sufficiently related to the business
interests of that source and gives rise to a shop right in the
resulting invention.
Since publication of the Moore case, there has been public
outcry over the potential exploitation of patients’ tissue without
proper compensation, or acknowledgment of the source of that
tissue.142 Rational people now fear that blood taken for one reason
shop right or similar privilege in favor of the employer must be determined from such
factors as the nature of the employer’s business, the character of the invention involved,
the circumstances under which it was created, and the relation, conduct, and intention of
the parties.”).
141
Presumably the patient “hires” a doctor to be treated for a medical problem and not
to capitalize on potentially lucrative preinventions in his blood.
142
See generally Karen Wright, The Body Bazaar; The Market in Human Organs Is
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can be used for unauthorized research and transformed into
patentable products about which they will not be informed.143 This
fear represents a fundamental distrust of the medical community,
which can be broken down into two parts. First, people fear that
doctors are increasingly likely to use their patients as living
experiments, and thus any inventions that may spring from such
experimentation are morally and ethically objectionable.144
Growing, DISCOVER, Oct. 1998, at 114.
143
See Talk of the Nation/Science Friday: Professor Lori Andrews, Professor David
Cox and Chuck Ludlam Discuss the Current Situation Involving the Patenting of Genetic
Materials and Sequences (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 29, 1999) (Transcript on file with
author and available at www.lexis.com).
Prof. ANDREWS: And right now there are other fallouts. I mean,
the Amgen patent on a gene is worth $ 1.5 billion a year. And so that
means that we’re turning patients into potential treasure troves. I
mean, John Moore, for example, a patient in California, was a target
of his physician who, without his knowledge or consent, purportedly
took out his cell-line and patented it. We’re seeing that all over. I
mean, for example, the breast cancer mutation that everybody knows
about affecting Ashkenazi Jewish women. That was done on blood
samples that they gave for other reasons without their knowledge or
consent. And now information has been developed about Ashkenazi
Jewish women that might be used to discriminate against them in
insurance, and so forth.
Mr. LUDLAM: Well, actually, we’ve. . .
Prof. ANDREWS: And so we’re not asking consent of patients in
many situations because the money is just so big and attractive. They
are. . .
Mr. LUDLAM: We’ve worked very hard on the discrimination issue.
In fact, in the Health Insurance Portability Act in ‘95, our industry
strongly supported a provision barring discrimination in group health
insurance based on genetic information.
Prof. ANDREWS: But your group also. . .
Mr. LUDLAM: And we had a good deal to do with enacting—that’s
current law. Most people don’t know.
Prof. ANDREWS: Mm-hmm.
Mr. LUDLAM: We’re now working on medical confidentiality to
deal with confidentiality of genetic information.
Prof. ANDREWS: Yeah, but your. . .
Mr. LUDLAM: We’re very strong believers that you need to prevent
abuse of this information.
Prof. ANDREWS: Sure. Yeah, but your industry also has pushed
through in state legislatures that did have laws protecting people’s
right to consent to DNA testing exceptions that allow researchers,
such as your companies, to have access to people’s blood samples
without their knowledge or consent.
Id.
144
See, e.g., Kevin O’Sullivan, Dolly’s Maker Advises on Research Use, IRISH TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1998, at A8 (quoting Irish Green Party politician as saying that biotechnology
was a “‘genetic assault on society’ with patients exploited by pharmaceutical industry
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Second, people have a general perception that medical patients are
being unduly exploited without their input or consent in the name
of technological progress.145 Failure to address these issues will
have widespread consequences, including undermining the
public’s confidence in the patent system and fostering the notion
that government is unwilling to address the ethical concerns of its
constituents, and is instead pandering to large biological research
concerns.
To address these fears most completely, the medical community
must be required to obtain consent for all uses of human-derived
biological material. Yet, this would be nearly impossible given the
sheer amount of biological material that would have to be tracked
and the prohibitive expense of finding the source to obtain
consent.146 Derived from definite and readily identifiable sources,
human cell-lines offer a more efficient method of balancing the
individual’s desire to control the use of his donated cells with the
preservation of scientific freedom to research. This would link the
financial success of the cell-line to the consent of the individual.
This may be accomplished without legislative effort by eliminating
the traditionally required nexus between an employee’s invention
and an employer’s business.
Unless the business nexus
requirement is eliminated, it is unlikely that a court will order
equitable division of patent rights between a physician-inventor
and his patient-employer by operation of the common law shop
right doctrine alone.147 Some judges might be reluctant to
saying ‘no patents, no cure.’ Ireland was allowing companies to ‘bio-prospect on patients
for profit’ . . . by facilitating secretive attempts to extract gene sequences.”).
145
See, e.g., Elizabeth Pennisi, NRC OKs Long-Delayed Survey of Human Genome
Diversity, SCIENCE, Oct. 24, 1997, at 568 (noting the fear that “indigenous populations
would be exploited because researchers might try to patent their DNA for use in medical
tests or other products without sharing the profits with the original donors”); Nicholas
Hildyard & Sarah Sexton, No Patents on Life, F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL’Y, Mar.
22, 2000, at 69.
146
To put this in perspective, Ameripath, which performs pathology services for only
170 hospitals, analyzes nearly 3 million tissue biopsies every year. Under an agreement
with DNA Sciences, a company that recruits people to donate their DNA to help find
genes that cause disease, Ameripath will provide them with several hundred thousand of
its accumulated samples. See Andrew Pollack, DNA Sought Online: Web Site Recruits
Donors to Contribute to ‘Gene Trust,’ Assist Disease Research, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 1, 2000, at 5D.
147
See Dubilier Condenser, 289 U.S. at 187 (“One employed to make an invention,
who succeeds, during his term of service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to
his employer any patent obtained. . . . On the other hand, if the employment be general,
albeit it cover a field of labor and effort in the performance of which he obtained a patent,
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recognize this concept because the public interest is presently
rarefied due to the small number of Moore-like cases.148
Therefore, in order to ensure that cell-line patents transmit shop
rights to the source of the cells, it would be prudent to find a
solution to the nexus problem outside of the judicial arena. One
promising possibility is contracting for limited rights in any
inventions resulting from tissue harvesting procedures in the
preinvention stage. Preinvention contracts, private agreements to
disregard some aspects of the common law shop right doctrine, can
overcome any difficulties inherent in the doctrine.149
B. Preinvention Contracts
A second long-established method of determining rights vesting
in as-of-yet created inventions is by preinvention contract.150 This
instrument can obligate the employee to assign to the employer all
interests in future patentable inventions conceived during the
employment relationship as a condition of that employment.151
The scope of such agreements varies, but even the liberal require
assignment of inventions made by the employee relating to the
employer’s business or research interests during the employment
relationship.152 Although the employee is named as inventor on
the contract is not so broadly construed as to require an assignment of the patent.”).
148
Regarding property rights in cell-lines, only a few cases have been filed. See, e.g.,
Moore, 793 P.2d at 479; Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic and Research Found., 810 F. Supp.
1091 (S.D. Cal. 1993); United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Maryland 1994).
One other similar case was filed but settled out of court. In that case researchers patented
a hybridoma that produced an anti-tumor antibody using cancer cells of the mother of a
post-doctoral student, Dr. Heideaki Hagiwara. See OTA REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
149
For a discussion of preinvention contracts generally, see Steven Cherensky, A
Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements,
Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1993).
150
See generally id.
151
See Cherensky, supra note 149, at 617-18.
152
See id. at 618 n.104.
Typical preinvention assignment agreements provide: The
undersigned agrees that he will disclose to the Company all
inventions, improvements, software, processes, ideas, and
innovations (hereinafter referred to, for convenience only, as
“Discoveries”), made or conceived by him, whether or not patentable
or copyrightable, either solely or in concert with others, and whether
or not made or conceived during working hours, during the period of
his employment, which (a) relate to the existing or contemplated
business or research activities of the Company; (b) result from the
use of the Company’s proprietary information, facilities, or resources;
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any patent applications, the employer is named as the assignee, or
legal owner of all relevant aspects of the patent by operation of the
agreement.153 This includes the right to exclude others (including,
in some cases, the employee himself) from making, using, or
selling the invention throughout the United States for a period of
twenty years.154 Parties who bargain for “preinvention” rights
cannot be certain of the value or even the exact subject matter of
their bargain at the time of contract,155 yet virtually all technical
employees work under such contracts.156 Preinvention agreements,
although adhesion contracts, are upheld by virtually all courts on
the basis of freedom of contract.157 In applying this existing body
of case law to modern cell-line invention cases, the questions that
must be answered are: 1) what kind of employee-employer
relationship must exist in order to have a preinvention agreement
upheld; 2) what is the duration of a doctor-patient employment
relationship, and is it sufficient to keep a preinvention agreement
in force for the length of time necessary to bring a cell-line
invention to fruition; 3) what consideration must a doctor receive
to make such an agreement binding; and 4) can a patient contract
for a partial transfer of rights where they provide no contribution
other than the source biological material?
Essentially, any clause in a contract for invention assignment is
enforceable regardless of the nature or duration of the employment
relationship, as long as it was not agreed to under duress and is not
unconscionable.158 Because preinvention contracts are enforceable
or (c) arise out of or result from work performed for the Company.
[The undersigned acknowledges that he is employed to engage in
research, design, and development.] The undersigned further agrees
to keep full and complete records concerning the development of
discoveries as above defined and to tender such records to the
company upon request.).
Id.
153
See 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 22.01, 22.02 (noting that the inventor is the
presumptive owner of the property rights in a patentable invention, but that he can
transfer ownership interest by written assignment. Even if ownership rights are assigned,
patent law requires the inventor to be named in the application for a patent.)
154
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
155
See Cherensky, supra note 149, at 598.
156
See id. at 599.
157
Signing a preinvention assignment agreement is an express condition of
employment, yet an enforceable one, barring any finding of overreaching on the part of
the employer. See Cherensky, supra note 149, at 600.
158
35 U.S.C. § 261 provides that patents are assignable by law. The enforceability of
the resulting “contract of assignment” is then analyzed under general contract principles.
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so long as they are not unconscionable, it is unlikely that a court
will make an extended inquiry into the depth of the employment
relationship.159 Thus, in situations where a preinvention contract
assigns limited rights in a patent to a patient, the courts do not need
to determine the degree to which a doctor-patient relationship may
be equated to a traditional employer-employee relationship. As to
the issue of consideration, the simplest way of disposing of this
issue is to tie the shop right either to the consent to research or to
the physical transfer of cells from the source to the doctor.
Introducing a new contractual step in obtaining consent to
research would, to some degree, increase the cost of medical care.
More significantly, however, it would raise the informed consent
burden of physician-researchers. Physicians would be forced to
take on the role of informing a patient about the potential value of
his cells or tissues as well as the pros and cons of having them
removed for health reasons. While this appears to be a difficult
issue to resolve in a doctor’s office, the benefit of the preinvention
contract approach is that, much like the second medical opinion, a
patient has the ability to obtain a secondary legal opinion prior to
consenting to the proposed research. No extended legal discussion
need be conducted between the physician and the patient, so long
as the physician recommends that the patient seek the advice of
competent counsel. The issue of informed consent will therefore
continue to focus primarily on the decision-making process
surrounding the health reasons a patient should or should not have
tissue removed. Assuming the two parties can come to an
understanding as to how the potential profit rights should be
distributed, they are free to codify this agreement in a contract with
whatever provisions may be necessary under the particular
circumstances. By separating the medical/research discussion
from the legal one, the preinvention approach can be adapted to fit
virtually any medical circumstances in which a doctor wants to
conduct research on a patient. This separation interposes a new
step in the informed consent process.
It is unlikely there will be a situation wherein the entire informed
consent and preinvention contractual process must be completed at
the time of the initial visit to the doctor, even if the need for
treatment is urgent. The hypothetical emergency patient can
See, e.g., Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 49, 51 (E.D. La. 1991).
159
See Cherensky, supra note 149, at 619-623.
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simply deny consent for research until such time as he has
contracted to protect his right to benefit from that research, while
still consenting to treatment for his emergency condition.160 Thus,
no patient can be unduly pressured into accepting a less-thanequitable deal. Alternatively, the patient might grant the doctor
provisional consent to store the cells without actually beginning
research, or consent to research with a prohibition on
commercializing any results until negotiations have been
completed to the patient’s satisfaction. With conditional consent,
it may be necessary for the court or legislature to intervene to
assure that the commercialization of the research does not proceed
without the patient’s express consent. This would only require a
court or legislature to make minor changes to expand the existing
informed consent laws of many states.
This preinvention contract system, combined with a small
expansion of informed consent law, would minimize transaction
costs. The initial transaction costs would be incurred in the
expansion of the informed consent procedures. These procedures
would be expanded to include a patient’s ability to refuse consent
to commercialization of their tissue, the recommendation that
patients seek the advice of a lawyer prior to consenting to such
commercialization, and the process of familiarizing patients with
the effect of these new choices. Once these transaction costs are
overcome, the only remaining cost would be an explanation of the
various options that the patient could choose. These options are
temporary storage pending later consent to research, research,
research but no commercialization, or research and
commercialization.
The shop right and preinvention contract address the most
prevalent difficulty with cell-line patents: that by ignoring the
source of the tissue, they fail to recognize that inventorship can
have both a passive and an active component. In other words, by
cutting the source of the original tissue out of the patent-proper,
current cell-line ownership arguments fail to acknowledge that
160

There is the possibility that a physician might want to publish his treatment of the
patient’s particular medical problem under the rubric of “medical research.” My
proposition, however, is accurate with respect to cell-line inventions. At the time of
emergency treatment, there is no need to rush a patient into consenting to allow a sample
of his tissue being taken for the purposes of producing a cell-line. This is because the
types of cells he has at the time of treatment are the same as those he will have much
later.
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there would be no invention and thus, no patent, without the
source’s contribution. The benefit of a patent law approach to the
allocation of profits between the patent owner and the source of the
bodily materials is that it does not necessarily require any
legislative action. It does, however, require a paradigm shift in the
doctor-patient relationship from paternalism to something
approaching parity. Working within the context of preinvention
contract litigation, courts will be able to overcome resistance to
this new paradigm by ratifying these restructured doctor-patient
relationships.
CONCLUSION
The Moore decision raised many novel questions regarding the
rights of medical research subjects in the world of biotechnology.
Although the California Supreme Court was willing to expand the
law of informed consent, it did not resolve the issue of individual
rights in inventions based on a patient’s discarded tissue.161 The
failure to acknowledge such rights has contributed to public outcry
over the ethical issues and financial inequities resulting from the
assignment of intellectual property rights in living inventions.162
Although the consent requirement gives the modern medical
patient some degree of control over the fate of his own bodily
tissue, this only protects his right to personal autonomy.163 In a
market-driven biological research paradigm, the research
participants should be afforded the freedom to control, and profit
from, the rights in their cells, which are essentially miniature
representations of their whole being. By refusing to grant such
rights, the Moore court undervalued the contributions of research
participants to the inventive process. In doing so, the court was
thereby guilty of that which it accused Moore: stifling medical
research by destroying the incentives for some of its participants.
Yet, while the immediate recognition of property rights in all
excised tissue would provide a solution to the problem articulated
by Moore, it would ultimately increase the costs for biological
research and medical care by expanding the administrative and
actual costs of compensating tissue donors. Nevertheless, this
161
162
163

See generally Moore, 793 P.2d at 479.
See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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should not preclude the extension of any rights to research
subjects.
The patent system provides not only powerful incentives to
invent, but well-developed solutions to allocate the financial
rewards that the patented inventions generate.164 By ratifying the
use of shop rights and preinvention contracts by research subjects,
courts can grant human sources compensation in proportion to
their contribution to an invention. This can be done with only
minor alterations in the current administration of medical
treatment. Recognizing these limited property rights would protect
individuals’ commercial interest in their bodies when the scientific
community is profiting from the use of the individuals’ bodily
materials. The disadvantages of this system are few, because the
patent-based solution for apportioning profits from a cell-line
protects the ability of academic and other not-for-profit research
institutions to continue their work without fear of litigation.
If future courts do not resolve the ownership and right-to-profit
issues, it is likely that public outcry over the inequities of the
present system will result in a call for legislative action. Yet,
legislative action is avoidable. While Moore broke new ground by
raising his dispute in the biotechnology arena, he essentially only
articulated new subjects for an old debate: the proper division of
rights in intellectual property. The large body of common law in
the various fields of intellectual property suggests that courts are
experienced in arbitrating such disputes within existing statutes.
Therefore, in order to protect the diverse interests of medical
researchers and their subjects most effectively, it is the courts that
should resolve the debate over property rights in human cells by
adapting the shop right doctrine and preinvention contracts to
balance the equities involved in this novel iteration of a classic
debate.

164

The shop right and preinvention contact are two examples of this.

